


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"These exertions have already been attended with success by sea and land, and "the late important and prosperous turn of "affairs, in North America, affords the fairest "prospect of the returning loyalty of my subjects in the colonies, and of their happy re-union with their parent country"!—KING's SPEECH, 8th July, 1780; just nineteen months before an envoy was appointed with authority to acknowledge the Americans as *a sovereign and independent people!*

"It is a great satisfaction to me to observe, "that the state of the commerce, manufactures and revenue of the country proves "the real extent and solidity of our resources, "and furnishes you with such means as must "be equal to any exertions which the present "crisis may require"!—KING's SPEECH, 6th October, 1796; just a hundred and forty-two days before this same King, in Council, issued an Order to authorize the Bank to refuse to pay its notes in gold, and to make pieces of paper, in fact, a legal tender.

"There never was a period, in the history "of this country, when ALL the great interests of the nation were, at the same time, "in so thriving a condition"!—KING's SPEECH, 3d February, 1825; just nine months before the Panic came, when more than a hundred banks broke, and when the Ministers said we were within forty-eight hours of barter.

KING'S SPEECH, Of 28th July, 1828.

Kensington, 6th August, 1828.

This Speech was not delivered by the King in person, but by what is called a Commission, consisting of four or five lords, or, at least, lords, 4 or 5 of whom only were present. These speeches have long been the queerest things in the world, having neither top nor tail, seeming to have no rational object, and being pieces of composition, whether as to language or arrangement, without any parallel in literary productions. During the American war, Mr. PAINE says that

the King's Speeches used to be looked for with the greatest possible interest, as subjects not of any serious concern, but of amusement: the yankees, he says, used to laugh most immoderately at these compositions; and he tells a story of two farmers riding up and meeting one another at a tavern door, one bawling out to the other, "have you seen uncle George's speech? What do you think of that, you!" And then, both fell to laughing till ready to fall off their horses. The truth is, that these speeches have always been subject of great merriment in that country; and I wish to God I could say that the case has been far otherwise in this. These compositions are invariably in the *commendatory* and *bragging* style: there is not a single exception to this rule. The three mottoes that I have taken to this Register will fully explain to any sensible man what has always been the course of policy with regard to these speeches. During the American war, which terminated in the disgraceful loss of those fine colonies which have now become a great maritime power, and which appear studiously to prepare the way for giving this system a heavy blow, to do which they have a perfect right, upon every principle, whether of policy or of humanity; during that war, a war waged by this system for the purpose of compelling our brethren in America to submit to taxation without representation; during that war, every King's Speech, even to the very last, held out the most flowery prospects to the people of this deluded country, that the war was just about to terminate by the submission of the rebels to the King's paternal authority! Defeat after defeat fell upon our armies, who were compelled to dance backward and forward, like shuttle-cocks. Two armies were actually captured; and their chiefs along with them, namely, Cornwallis and Burgoyne; and still the infatuated people of this country were induced to believe that the royal cause was prospering, and that the rebels were upon

the point of unconditional submission. While the haughty and insolent aristocracy of England was furnishing our army with generals, the shops or farm-houses were doing the like for the Americans : in every correspondence ; in every negotiation ; in every parley ; the Americans showed their superiority over these branches and sprigs of nobility, whose insolent contempt they repaid by dignified and inflexible firmness. The correspondence between WASHINGTON and CLINTON is enough to make an Englishman blush himself to death. Yet, even the people of this country gave in to the contemptuous language with regard to the Americans, and never were they cured until the dismal and disgraceful moment when the treaty was signed which acknowledged the sovereignty and independence of the latter.

In this work of delusion and of creating that formidable enemy which we now hardly dare think of, King's speeches had a principle hand. The present speech is not, indeed, of the description of those of that day : its tone is humble, comparatively speaking ; but, nevertheless, it contains matter calculated to produce impressions that ought not to remain : it glosses over things which ought to be laid bare ; and, therefore, it shall receive from me that attention, and on it shall be made those observations, which I think the nature of the case demands.

" My Lords and Gentlemen,

1. " We are commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you, that the business of the Session having been brought to a close, his Majesty is enabled to release you from your attendance in Parliament.

2. " His Majesty commands us, at the same time, to return to you his warm acknowledgments for the zeal and diligence with which you have applied yourselves to the consideration of *many subjects of great importance to the public welfare.*

3. " The provision which you have made for the regulation for the import of Corn, combining *adequate protection for domestic agriculture*, with *due precaution against the consequences of a deficient harvest*, will, in the *confident expectation of his Majesty*, promote the

inseparable interests of all classes of his subjects.

4. " We are commanded by his Majesty, to acquaint you, that his Majesty continues to receive from his Allies, and from *all foreign powers*, assurances of their *friendly dispositions towards this country.*

5. " The endeavours of his Majesty to effect the pacification of Greece, in concert with his allies, the King of France and the Emperor of Russia, have *continued unabated.*

6. " His Imperial Majesty has found himself *under the necessity* of declaring war against the Ottoman Porte, upon grounds *concerning exclusively the interests of his own dominions, and unconnected with the stipulations of the treaty of the 6th of July, 1827.*

7. " His Majesty deeply laments the occurrence of these hostilities, and will omit no effort of *friendly interposition to restore peace.*

8. " The determination of the powers, parties to the treaty of the 6th of July, to effect the objects of that treaty, *remains unchanged.*

9. " His Imperial Majesty has consented to *waive the exercise in the Mediterranean sea of any rights appertaining to his Imperial Majesty, in the character of a Belligerent Power*, and to recall the separate instructions which had been given to the commander of his naval forces in that sea, directing hostile operations against the Ottoman Porte.

10. " His Majesty will, therefore, continue to combine his efforts with those of the King of France and his Imperial Majesty, for the purpose of *carrying into complete execution the stipulation of the treaty of London.*

11. " His Majesty commands us to acquaint you, that his Majesty had every reason to hope, when he last addressed you, that the arrangements which had been made for administering the government of Portugal, until the period at which the Emperor of Brazil should have completed his abdication of the throne of Portugal, would have secured the peace, and promoted the happiness of a country, in the welfare of which his Majesty has ever taken the deepest interest. The *just expectations* of his Majesty have been disappointed, and measures have been adopted in Portugal, in *disregard of the earnest advice and repeated remonstrances of his Majesty*, which have compelled his Majesty and the other powers of Europe, acting in concert with his Majesty, to withdraw their Representatives from Lisbon.



12. "His Majesty *relies upon the wisdom of the august sovereign*, the head of the house of Braganza, to take the course which shall be best calculated to maintain the interests and honour of that illustrious family, and to secure the peace and happiness of the dominions over which it reigns."

"*Gentlemen of the House of Commons,*

13. "We are commanded by his Majesty to thank you for the Supplies which you have granted to him for the service of the present year. His Majesty will apply them, with *the utmost regard to economy*, and will continue a deliberate revision of the public establishments, with a view to any further reduction which may be compatible with *the dignity of the Crown*, and with *the permanent interests of the country*.

"*My Lords and Gentlemen,*

14. "His Majesty commands us to *congratulate you upon the general prosperity of the country*, and upon the satisfactory state of the Public Revenue.

15. "His Majesty contemplates the *increase of our financial resources with peculiar gratification*, on account of the decisive proof which it exhibits, that *the condition of his subjects is one of progressive improvement*.

16. "His Majesty commands us, in conclusion, to assure you, that his unabated exertions will be directed to inculcate among Foreign Powers *a spirit of mutual good will*, and to encourage the industry, to extend the commerce, and advance the general welfare of his own dominions."

We will take the speech in the order in which it lies before us. Paragraph 2 tells us, that the King returns his warm acknowledgments to the two Houses of Parliament, for their proceedings relative to *many subjects of great importance to the public welfare*. An enumeration of these subjects was judiciously omitted; for, I do not recollect one such subject having been brought before Parliament, and carried, to any beneficial result. At the outset of the session, a strong picture was drawn of the deplorable state of the country, arising, as was alleged, from the abuse of the poor-laws, from the state of the game-laws, and from other causes. The monstrous increase of crime was pourtrayed, and great hopes

were held out of a reduction of the burthens of the people. No alteration has taken place, tending to remove any one of these evils: the discussions on the poor-laws have been childish in the extreme; a game-bill, which had passed the House of Lords, and the place of which had been supplied in the House of Commons, on account of some technical error, was totally rejected in the House in which it originated, and in which it had passed, though the Commons had introduced into it no new provision whatsoever; and thus, this matter, which, at the beginning of the session, every one who spoke upon the subject said, could not be suffered to remain another year without some remedy, without exposing the country to something like civil war; thus was this great matter left just in the state that this zealous and diligent parliament found it. With regard to reduction of burthens, not the weight of a feather has been taken off, and not the smallest desire, as far as I have seen, to make any such reduction. Something there has been about the new naming and the shifting of funds; but the debt and the taxes remain what they were; and not a soul in the kingdom has the smallest hope that any reduction is contemplated.

Paragraph 3 eulogises the *corn-bill*, and says that it gives adequate protection for domestic agriculture, with due precaution against the consequences of deficient crops. If the nation were polled, ninety-nine out of every hundred men, would declare that this law, which never can give any protection at all to agriculture, which must become a dead letter as soon as scarcity shows its face, is simply *a tax upon bread*; that its only tendency is to cause corn to be dearer than it otherwise would be; that its object is to enrich the owners of the land at the expense of the rest of the community; and that it attempts, amidst professions about free-trade, the monstrous impossibility of making foreign nations pay a high price for the victuals that is consumed by those who make the goods which they receive from this country. Already has this series of measures, called *corn-laws*, produced a striking

retaliation in the *American tariff*; and, our late minister of trade and inventor of the new and liberal system, has recommended *retaliatory* measures on America, because she is about to refuse to receive wearing-apparel and hard-ware made by those who are not permitted to eat the bread of which she has so great a superabundance. There can be no doubt that, if the manufacturers of England were permitted to eat the American flour, not only would the goods be cheaper, but the exchange advantageous to America; but it never can be sensible conduct in America, to receive her goods from those who are not suffered to smell the produce of her soil. This tariff of America, of which, by-the-by, the speech says nothing, unless it be taken to be one of those assurances of "*friendly disposition*" of which his Majesty talks: this tariff, as every one must plainly see, is among the fair fruits of the corn-bill. Until the year 1818, or, rather, until the year 1817, or thereabouts, the Americans never talked of, or thought of, additional duties upon English goods. Our ports had long been open to their corn and flour, and they found something like reciprocity in receiving our goods at a very low duty: the food came to feed the makers of the goods, and the exchange was not so manifestly prejudicial to America. But, when the series of corn-laws began, when the land-owners here resolved that the Americans should wear cloth and cotton, and use hard-ware, made by people not suffered to touch American bread, then the duties began to rise in America. For a while they rose slowly; the restrictive system was not lightened, because we had slackened in some parts of ours: the Americans did not, as Huskisson says they did, take up the restrictive code, because we had abandoned it: they tightened their code because we, so far from abandoning ours, had made it more exclusive than ever, with regard to the great articles of American produce, namely, wheat and flour; and it is very pretty, indeed, for us to talk of *retaliation* upon America, because she will not receive our goods while we shut out her corn and her flour. Something of the same sort, differing in

time and degree, will take place with regard to other nations, who have corn to export: the corn-bill will cause a diminution of production in all those countries which used to export to this; and, if we were visited with a serious scarcity, the fruits of the corn-bill would lie before us in the ravings of a famished people. For my part, therefore, I do not participate in the confident expectation of his Majesty, that this Bill will promote the interests of all classes of his subjects; but, on the contrary, I am satisfied that it will promote the interests of only one class, and do injury to all the rest.

Paragraph 4 repeats to us that eternal assurance on the part of his Majesty, that he continues to receive from all foreign powers assurances of their friendly disposition towards this country. As kings have longer arms, so, I suppose, they have sharper eyes, than other people; for, if all these foreign powers do entertain this friendly disposition, my readers will surely say with me, that they have a devilish odd way of showing it. The Americans, as I observed before, have treated us to their tariff; and, Huskisson expressly declared in the House of Commons the other day, that this tariff was levelled solely against us, and that it was a blow aimed at our commercial prosperity. Now, America is a foreign power, and this is her assurance, or, at least, the only assurance that she has given us of any disposition at all towards us; and if this disposition be *friendly*, how the devil can it call for *retaliation*, that retaliation which Huskisson says he shall propose during the next session of parliament. Portugal is a foreign power; for it has now shown that it is no longer a colony: and it will hardly be pretended that her dispositions are over-friendly. Very friendly, no doubt, the march of the Russians into the heart of the Turkish empire, and not less friendly, as the result will make appear, the French expedition to Egypt.

Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, do tell a most shocking story. The Emperor of Russia and the King of France are still our allies, and still endeavouring, in concert with his Majesty,¹⁰

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effect the *pacification of Greece!* Still combining their efforts with those of his Majesty, to carry into complete execution the stipulations of the treaty of London! Paragraph 8, and paragraph 10, seem to be a sheer repetition, as if the writer of the speech had thought it necessary to assert more than once, that the three parties to the treaty of the 6th of July were still anxiously labouring to effect its stipulations. The disturbances in Greece arose from a contest between the colony and the superior country. To be sure, one way of effecting a pacification is to over-run, subjugate, and root out, the superior power; and this seems to be what Russia is now engaged in; and in this way I suppose it is that she is sincerely endeavouring to carry into complete execution the stipulations of the treaty of London. Oh dear, no: the war that she is carrying on against Turkey, "proceeds on grounds concerning *exclusively* the interests of the 'Russians themselves,' and *unconnected* with the stipulations of the treaty of London! This is something of a nature to call forth expressions that one does not like to make use of; but one may just ask, at *what time* these grounds of war between Russia and Turkey arose? The Russian declaration shows that they all existed previous to the forming of the treaty of London: since the forming of that treaty, the Turks have done nothing to offend Russia: therefore Russia entered into that treaty with a knowledge of all these grounds of war being in existence; and, when she had prevailed upon us (the only power capable of defending Turkey against her) to assist her in crippling the power which it was our interest to defend, and when she had discovered, from our weakly yielding to that treaty, that we possessed not the means of going to war; when she had made this discovery and had obtained our aid in the crippling of Turkey, she threw off the mask, called up from oblivion her old complaints against Turkey, beat to arms at once, and is now within a little of thundering at the gates of Constantinople; or, at least, if there she be not, nothing upon this earth can prevent her, except that good fortune which now and then comes and

saves a devoted state. In the meanwhile, the views of the French are any thing but unequivocal; a part of Egypt may fall to her lot, or some other part of the Ottoman empire. In short, the probable end will be, the distribution, amongst Russia, Austria and France, of the several parts of this ancient empire, which will not be long before it be followed by the exclusion of the English from the Levant. Paragraph 9 gives us a most curious piece of information; namely, that the Emperor of Russia has consented to *waive* the exercise of his *rights in the Mediterranean sea!* where he never had any rights, and where he never would have had a ship of war, had we not been weighed down by that infernal system, by the means of which Pitt and his successors have crippled and bent to the earth this once powerful and lofty nation. Forty years ago, Russia had no more thought of having rights in the Mediterranean, than of having rights in Torbay; and now we deem it a sort of favour that the Emperor of Russia abstains from interrupting our commerce with the Turks, from interdicting us by blockades, and from bringing our Levant ships in for a judication in his courts. This is a pretty state to have been brought into: let the reader once more look over the paragraphs from No. 5 to No. 10 inclusive; let him look at the dismal story; let him look at the miserable excuses, and then let him join Vansittart and the Duke of Wellington in applauding the system of "that great man, Mr. Pitt," amongst whose successors they have been, and, as they profess, still are. The French, even in their legislative assemblies, express admiration at the "*immobility*" of England, and one of them, the other day, sarcastically observed, in speaking of the pacific conduct of this country, "*il n'y a rien qui tranquillize comme le manque d'argent*": that is, "there is nothing like want of money to keep people quiet," a remark that the judges have been in the habit of making for centuries past. In short, our situation is seen by all the nations in the world: just and wise as is the American Tariff, it would not have been adopted, or, at least, would not have come forth in so undis-

guisedly an hostile manner, had it not been for the thorough knowledge which the statesmen at Washington have of the wretched and complicated pecuniary embarrassments that surround us. They know well, that we can but just jog along as it is ; and that war is dreaded by our Government more than any thing ever was dreaded by any government in the world. If any further commentary were wanted on this part of the Speech, we have it in the fact, that *a Russian fleet of nine sail* went, only yesterday, down the "*English Channel*," on its way to the *Mediterranean* ! This is, I suppose, an additional proof that Russia means to adhere, with the *most scrupulous fidelity*, to CANNING's treaty of the 6th July, 1827 ! In short, our enemies are doing what they like with the world. They know, that we cannot go to war without producing a most *terrible convulsion* at home. This makes them bold ; and they will push forward, till they have brought us down *low indeed* !*

* The following are the remarks of the *Courier Francais* upon this part of the Speech :—"The Ministry (it says) seek to disguise their impotence the best way they can. They discover that the Emperor of Russia found himself under the necessity of declaring war against the Ottoman Porte for reasons which relate exclusively to his own dominions ; whence it follows that the entrance of the Russians into Constantinople—the conquest of Turkey—will be an event to which Great Britain ought to remain a stranger. This is very different from the language held at the opening of the Session ; it is true that, by way of compensation, the Emperor Nicholas consents that his fleet in the Mediterranean should not act hostilely against the Porte without the concurrence of the other squadrons. This is a *glorious indemnification for England*, and his Imperial Majesty has made a great concession in renouncing the attack of Turkey by sea with eight or ten vessels, while he will occupy it immediately by land with three or four hundred thousand combatants ! So long as *Statesmen* were at the head of the Cabinet of Saint James's, they expressed themselves with *more energy* respecting events which may cause Great Britain to lose for ever her influence in Europe. The English Ministry could only descend to such an avowal of their weakness and incapacity, by being *under the direction of a Soldier*, whom chance favoured once, and whom the spirit of party wished to puff off as the hero of the age."

Paragraph 11 brings before us his Majesty's views with regard to *Portugal*: the speech tells us that his Majesty has always taken the deepest interest in the affairs of that country ; that his *just expectations* with regard to it have been, however, disappointed ; that his *earnest advice* and *repeated remonstrances* have been disregarded ; and that he, in concert with the other powers of Europe, has withdrawn his Ambassador from Lisbon. As to these other powers of Europe, who are said to act in concert with his Majesty, that man must be half an ideot who does not believe that they all rejoice at what has taken place ; and this, I dare say, his Majesty knows pretty well by this time. His Majesty, therefore, tells us in paragraph 12, that he *relies entirely upon the wisdom of Don Pedro*, to take proper measures in this case. So best ! and better still would it have been, if his Majesty had not expended his earnest advice and repeated his remonstrances before mentioned ; for (and all the world will ask the same question) what had this country to do with the internal concerns of Portugal ? What had we to do with making or causing to be adopted, a new Constitution for Portugal ? What right had we to interfere in such a case ; and, above all things, what right had we to send out troops for that purpose ; for the purpose, as no man living can deny, of causing to be adopted in that country, a mode of government entirely new, inconsistent with and hostile to all the ancient institutions of the kingdom, evidently tending in its result to a revolution by confiscation and by an overthrow of the ecclesiastical power of the country, and, as experience has proved, equally hostile to the opinions and wishes of the people ?

It would be improper to omit taking, upon this occasion, a glance at our transactions with regard to the two kingdoms of the Peninsula, since the peace of 1814. And, first, as to Spain, where we had obtained great influence, and where we favored, by all the means in our power, the introduction and establishment of a new species of government. There was to be a king, to be

ture, and there was one ; but, this king was the mere puppet, or rather, the slave of the Cortes ; the obligations which he contracted with whom were like the promises which we make to a robber with a drawn knife at our throats. These Cortes began their career by plunging the nation in debt. For what ? If the people had been decidedly for the Cortes, what need had the Cortes of money and of levies of troops ? These debts were contracted with jews and jobbers in England, who looked for re-payment to confiscations in Spain ; so that, all public property, all Church property, all the monasteries, with their estates, every establishment for the relief of the poor and the aged and the widow and the stranger : all this was to be mortgaged and finally siezed upon for the benefit of the infamous usurers in England, they allowing a participation of the gains to the immaculate members of the Cortes themselves. And, for what motive was this focus of revolution and of villainous confiscation to be encouraged and kept alive ? Now, mark, reader : the motive was, that Spain might be kept in a crippled state, and that a revolution continually bubbling up in Spain might keep France in a constant state of uneasiness and of danger, and thus keep her diverted from those objects which internal tranquillity and the immensity of her resources might lead her to contemplate, and which objects contemplated by her, *might compel us to assume the attitude of war.* Yes, our own incapacity for war, and the *pride that made us dread provocation*, made no desire to keep France in a state of constant agitation and alarm, and this could not be better done than by encouraging a set of confiscators to form armies on the other side of the Pyrenees. France took alarm at the danger ; she resolved to put it down ; she marched for that purpose ; she effected her object completely ; and, we all recollect the monstrous though mean efforts that were made here to prevent her from taking that step. First we negotiated strenuously at Verona ; next we made our efforts at Paris ; next we threw out threats ; and all having proved unavail-

ing, we were compelled to come to the last resort of the feeble, send up prayers and pour forth abuse. Whoever will look back at what passed at that time will blush for our conduct. The abuse poured forth upon the King of Spain surpassed, ten million times, that which has recently been poured forth on Don Miguel. We were not at war with the King of Spain, and yet the newspapers of this country were suffered to libel him in language such as never had been tolerated towards any foreign sovereign, even in time of war. He was represented as a tyrant and even as a monster, merely because he resumed that authority which Lewis the 18th. had resumed in France ; merely because he stepped back into the throne from which, in fact, he had been ejected, and because he rescued his people from the degrading slavery which they must have submitted to, if the plans of the Cortes had been carried into full execution. We seemed to imagine that all the world was made for our advantage and our pleasure ; and that, because it suited our purpose that a confiscating revolution should exist in Spain, the King of Spain and all his councillors were *criminals* for putting an end to that revolution. We seemed to think it a perfectly right thing, that an ancient kingdom, one of the most famous in the world, should be shaken to pieces, that all its establishments and institutions should be broken up ; that all its public wealth should be mortgaged and dissipated ; and that its people should be set roaming about to rob or to commit other acts of violence, inseparable from every people, in such a state of things. We seemed to think it a wrong done to us, that the King of Spain should have disapproved of the confiscation of the property of the Church, and of the ejection and extirpation of the holders and administrators of that property. In the whole course of my life, I never knew so large a part of the people of England misled as were misled at that time. The Cortes had made loans in London ; the Cortes were to see the money-lenders paid ; the Cortes could not pay without confiscation ; and, therefore, in that same England, where French confisca-

tions had been so loudly condemned, the justice of confiscations was maintained and the Cortes applauded to the skies. I was the only man in England who had the courage to raise his voice publicly and loudly and decidedly against that popular cry. Time has sobered the public in this respect: all but those who had an interest in the promised plunder, have long began to think that the King of Spain had reason and justice on his side; and the same will be their opinion with regard to Don Miguel before this day twelvemonths. Here, too, we had got a new Constitution; here, too, we had got a couple of chambers; here, too, was a *bank* established; and the new Constitution had begun in the usual way, to contract debts and to mortgage the country; here, too, the focus of revolution has been dissipated, and we are left to lament over its fate. There is nothing more abominable, nothing more arrogant, more insolent, than the thought that every country, however great or populous, is to be sacrificed if *our interest* require it, and what is truly diabolical is, that all those belonging to that country, who prevent the sacrifice, were to be represented as wretches worthy of extermination. The abuse, good God! that has been poured out upon the ecclesiastics of Portugal and Spain, who were applauded to the skies, observe, while they were so powerfully aiding us in the expulsion of the French! Then, oh, then, they were the most pious and most valuable persons in the world; but, when their endeavours were directed to prevent confiscation and plunder for the benefit of the infamous Jews and jobbers of London, they became, all at once, the most "ignorant," the most "bigoted," the most "superstitious," most "selfish," most "greedy wretches," upon the face of the earth. When the monks of Spain were animating the guerrillas to those deeds of wondrous valour by which they annoyed the Republicans of France, they were held up in England to the admiration of the world! But, when they came to exercise their influence to prevent their convents from being confiscated, the poor despoiled of their inheri-

tance, and their country actually torn to pieces, then they were, in that same England, represented as monsters in human shape. This is the true history of the conduct of England, with regard to Spain and Portugal, since the peace. We have lost our influence in both countries, notwithstanding the great partiality of the Spaniards towards us, a partiality which had continued for many ages; and, notwithstanding the extensive trade carried on between the two countries, and the unlimited confidence, collective and individual, which had so long existed between the two nations. It has been said, and frequently is said, that these new constitutions would have bettered the lot of the people in Spain and Portugal; would have improved their state; would have caused them to be more *industrious* and *enterprising*; and would have introduced, altogether, a state of things more like that which existed in England when the people of England were well off. These are all assumptions, perfectly gratuitous: we do not know that the change would have produced any of these effects; if we had possessed any right to interfere in the matter, the sole question ought to have been "will the change make the people *more happy*?" But, we were not called upon nor were we authorized to take any step to effect any change at all, or to give any encouragement to any innovators whatever. It is the height of presumption in us to pretend to determine what sort of government is best for another country: into that question enters due consideration as to the habits, the manners, the character of the people, all which are affected in a greater or less degree by climate and by various other circumstances, of which we can have no knowledge; when we behold a kingdom that has existed under laws and a religion which prevailed there before England was rescued from barbarism, it is presumption most monstrous in us to say that all this ought to be torn to pieces and left to be re-modelled by whomsoever may happen to get the greatest number of soldiers at his back. We are, however, I trust, now pretty well cured of this itch for constitution-making, and

are prepared to suffer the people of Portugal and Spain, who have, in both cases, shown their unalienable attachment to the old order of things, to continue to move quietly along without, at any rate, being cursed with national debts, and all their terrible offspring. His Majesty's Speech has pleased me greatly in this respect. It *abandons* Portugal to the wisdom of Don Pedro : he, doubtless, will give it up to the wisdom of Don Miguel ; and he, like his ancestors, will be compelled to suffer it to go on much about in its usual way. We shall live in harmony, I trust, with the Portuguese again : we shall have their wine, oranges, nuts and figs, and they will have something made by hard-working people in a colder climate : the Portuguese will all go quietly to *mass* ; and, I take upon me to predict, that they will never interrupt us, in going to any of our *forty-five sorts of meeting-houses*. To be sure, and I must say this of both Portuguese and Spaniards, that, having had offered to them *constitutions* resembling "the *envy of surrounding nations and admiration of the world*," it was to show great *perverseness* not to adopt them with thanks, and especially as the "*envy and admiration*" included, amongst other things equally valuable, being shut up in one's house from sun-set to sun-rise on pain of transportation without trial by jury; also the rare immunity of being banished for life, in case one should happen to utter any thing having a tendency to bring into contempt those who passed Peel's Bill, and who also passed laws for sending mouths out of the country, while they declared that the great evil was a surplus of food. Not to embrace with eagerness a scheme of government that caused a sixpenny pot of beer to pay four-pence in tax; not to embrace with eagerness the fair prospect of having treadmills, and of having the very great blessing of making bread and water or potatoes the food of the people at large : to reject a generous offer like this, argued, doubtless, great *perverseness* in the Spaniards and Portuguese ; but, if they had no taste for being shut up in their houses from sun-set to sun-rise ; if they wanted the sense duly to estimate the

advantage of being banished for life on account of the unruly movements of the tongue or the pen ; if they like to ramble about in the night at their pleasure, and to spend their days in the Peninsula in the open air, instead of taking a voyage to Botany Bay or enjoy the delightful exercise of the tread-mill at home : if, in short, they preferred the slavery of living at large, and the chance of indigestion from the eating of meat, to the blessed state enjoyed by people under the envy and admiration : if the Portuguese and Spaniards liked this best, what the devil had we to do with it ! The wise way would have been to do that which his Majesty has wisely done now : leave them to themselves : leave them to suffer for not having followed his earnest advice and listened to his repeated remonstrances : leave them as Huskisson, Doctor Black, and Joseph Hume, leave the Americans, to "*taste the bitter fruits of their folly*."

Paragraph 14 invites us to leave the Spaniards and Portuguese to suffer for the want of taxes ; to pay the price of their obstinacy in the want of banishment for life, and transportation without trial by jury, for being out of their houses between sunset and sunrise ; for, in this paragraph, his Majesty congratulates the Parliament on "*the general prosperity of the country*." Our faith, indeed, is somewhat shaken here, when we look at the three mottoes to the present Register ; and this assertion of the prosperity of the country seems not to square very well with the dismal accounts of the increase of crime laid before this same Parliament, with the various schemes for relieving the wretchedness of the people ; and particularly with that notable scheme for sending Englishmen away from their country by means of a mortgage on the poor-rates ! It is true that this scheme was not adopted ; but it was more than half recommended by a Committee of the House of Commons ; and, in order to be convinced of the wretched state of the country, we have only to know that the making of the proposition was tolerated by the Parliament. The truth is, that never was there a country upon earth

further removed from a state of prosperity : the cultivators of the land are notoriously sinking down into poverty : there is no branch of trade that flourishes : the ship-owners complain that they are ruined, and in every branch of trade in London the want of profit is so notorious as to be matter of observation daily and hourly. The bankruptcies have been converted into insolvencies ; and these have been and are so numerous, that the thing to look for is, not the trader who has been an insolvent, but the trader who has not. Amidst all this, however, and while thieving and sheep-stealing are, from one end of the country to the other, looked upon as things too common to attract much attention, we are gravely told that the increase of our financial resources is a decisive proof that the people are in a condition of progressive improvement. Assertions like these cannot be intended for *home consumption* : they must be intended for exportation and for consumption abroad ; but, I imagine that they are of little value in that respect ; for, by this time, every foreign nation who cares any thing at all about us is pretty well informed of the real nature of our situation.

Paragraph 15 tells us that his Majesty contemplates "*the increase of our financial resources with peculiar gratification.*" He will have to congratulate the Parliament next year on a further increase ; for the *corn-bill*, which added only one million sterling to the revenue last year, will probably add two or three millions this year. What an addition here will be to the proofs of the prosperity of the country and of the happiness of the people ! That miserable people who will have been compelled to pay several millions in tax upon their bread, in order to fill the pockets of the owners of the land ! But, what is meant by this increase of financial resources ? What *resource* is there at all ? The whole of the land and of all the real property is mortgaged to the fundholders for more than it is worth. There is no resource but in annual exactions ; and even these are annually anticipated by loans from the bank. The whole is a fiction, and there is nothing at all appertaining to it,

meriting the name of a resource. Every resource is anticipated : there is nothing left by the means of which war or any other expense can be encountered. A resource means something that is yet unappropriated : here there is no resource ; for the whole of the revenues of the country are anticipated for ever. Besides this, we are not yet come to the moment of trial ; we are not to see our real situation until the one-pound notes have completely disappeared. As long as they remain in circulation, our money itself is a fiction ; and, when they shall cease to circulate, the day of trial will come. Cease to circulate they must, however, or the government will be covered with disgrace not to be described. If, after this boasting of the increased financial resources, we should happen to *return to the paper*, and that return should be followed (as it must be) by another bank-restriction, an extract from this present speech may be added very conveniently and appropriately to the three extracts which I have taken for my motto. God forbid that I should believe that the Duke of Wellington will ever consent to this return to the paper ; but I believe that the greater part of the members of both Houses of Parliament think that he will ; and that Huskisson is decidedly of this opinion, every person of any penetration must perceive from his speech in the House of Commons of the 15th of July. This speech, coming lagging in at the end of the session, and incidentally, too, seems to have attracted little public attention ; but, I deem it worthy of such attention ; and I shall insert here such parts of it as relate to the subject before us, adding to it by-and-by, some remarks which appear to me necessary to be made. There was a short speech of Mr. Maberly, too, which I shall insert as well as that of Mr. Huskisson.

He concurred with his Right Hon. Friend in the statement that much of our internal improvement arose from the greater freedom which had been given to our commerce within the last few years, and to the general improvement which had, consequently, taken place amongst all classes of the people. But with respect to the present state of our Unfunded Debt, he thought it was a subject which required the greatest attention from his Majes-

ly's Government. If it were continued in its present state—if measures were not taken to diminish it, and to take it out of the hands of the Bank of England, he could not help saying that he saw in it considerable prospective danger. In the year 1823 the Bank had contracted for what was known by the name of the Dead Weight; but, at the time of the contract, it was fully understood that the purchase was to be distributed amongst others. So then thought his Majesty's Government, and, he believed, did many of the Bank Directors. The Bank was not to have the sole benefit of the contract, nor to divest so much of what should be applied to mercantile discounts, to the use to which they had since applied it. If a distribution were not intended, then the Bank might as well have advanced capital on lands or houses for the number of years until the contract should have ceased. But this was not the only evil. The Bank did not act in this case for the whole body of the Proprietors of their Stock; the advance they made was that of the credit of the Bank, over which neither the Government nor the Country had any proper and necessary control. This was a state of things which should not be allowed to continue, and in a word, the sooner the contract could be regulated, if not altogether got rid of, the better would it be for the Government and the Country. He had every respect for the Directors of the Bank of England—but he had still greater respect for the interest of the public. The Bank on this dead weight account had advanced 11 millions—on Exchequer Bills, also a large amount—on mercantile Bills very little; and under such circumstances it would be desirable that the Bank should not be in a situation to distress the trade of the country, or under the necessity of again reverting to a Bank Restriction Act. (Hear, hear!) *He did not believe that any inconvenience would result from calling in the 11. notes;* but the Bank at this moment had above six millions unemployed, which had come to their hands in the shape of deposits. Under any unfavourable circumstances, this condition of the Bank could not be regarded without some apprehension. The amount of our unfunded debt should be diminished now as much as we possibly could, in order to enable us to meet any future contingencies. If the public felt that the amount of Exchequer Bills was at any time too large, they could be paid off. If the Bank felt inconvenience from holding Exchequer Bills, they might claim the payment of them. But in the other case the public had no control over the payment. When he considered that the Bank had advanced 11,000,000*l.*, and had made a large advance with reference to Exchequer Bills, and that the Deficiency Bills exceeded eight millions on the last 5th July, he thought the case required the deepest consideration. The only description of advance in which the Bank was deficient was upon mercantile Bills of Exchange. Looking to all these circumstances and to the situation

of the country, it was very desirable to be so placed that the Bank of England, in order to do justice to its engagements with the public, should not be under the necessity of either disturbing the circulation of the country, or of taking a course inconsistent with the maintenance of the present metallic currency. He would wish to guard against what he conceived the greatest of all evils, the evil of reverting to a *Bank Restriction Act*. They heard from various parts of the country that there was likely to be an obstruction of the gold circulation, on account of the calling in of the one pound notes. *He did not believe this.* In the metropolis, in the opinion of many dealing in money, there was a plethora—a plethora such as never before existed. The Bank of England at the present moment, at least it was a matter of common rumour, had deposits of money, for which it could find no beneficial employment, to the amount of more than 6,000,000*l.* This was a larger deposit than was ever known; a larger sum than had ever been lying dead in the Bank of England. Every London Banker is similarly situated. *They had no means of employing their deposits of money.* Under these circumstances he could only say, that should a very unfavourable state of the Exchange occur, and a necessity arise for a pecuniary exertion, the sudden effect upon the state of the currency and of the circulation would be severely felt. The deposit of 6,000,000*l.* might be withdrawn, and what would prevent the Bank from diminishing the circulation to protect the issue of its balance? Under such circumstances, which might occasionally occur, it would be desirable, upon every account, upon every principle of economy, to place the Unfunded Debt in more contracted circumstances. He was not certain, that of all the evils which had visited this country for long periods, at least for the last hundred years, the restrictions unfortunately placed on cash payments by the Bank in 1797 was not the greatest. In consequence of that restriction, the last quarter of a century had produced more mischief, more moral and political evils, more confusion, than any other measure to which Parliament had given its sanction. It might be too much to allude to the danger of a renewal of such an evil; but he would say, that no sacrifice could be too great for the country to make, in order to prevent a renewal of all the calamities which another *Bank Restriction Act* would bring upon the country. He could never persuade himself that it was safe for any Bank, standing as the Bank of England did, not to relieve itself of part of its engagements, and acquire a means of employing its capital, which was now so superabundant. The Dead Weight Annuities might be sold, and gradually distributed amongst the community. These, with mortgages, and other advances, were funds which no bank ever thought of resorting to as a permanent mode of investing its capital. In 1793, nearly one half of the Bank issues were in mercantile discounts. The Bank of France

had a capital of about \$,000,000*l.*, and it employed more than one half of the capital in mercantile discounts. The amount of discounts with the Bank of England was *very inconsiderable*. If there were not sufficient demand for their discounts, let them reduce their rates of discount. Last year there had been an increase of the Unfunded Debt by 3,000,000*l.* The Dead Weight was 2,000,000*l.* This year the deficiency bills had increased; and if the country were placed in the situation of 1825 (*of which the previous signs were obvious*), they would be paying dearly for what they now enjoyed. The Bank, in any event, would be safe, but it would be at the expense of the country. He trusted that the Unfunded Debt would be placed in a state more consonant to the interests of the public.

Mr. MABERLY was aware of the great inconvenience of the present state of the Unfunded Debt, and of the system of the Dead Weight. In 1825, the Bank could scarcely have gone on two hours without a *Restriction Act*. He thought the present system of the Deficiency Bills was dangerous. The Bank, by the *Government anticipating its quarter's revenue* might be in a situation to say, if they did not grant them a *Restriction Act*, they would not make advances to pay the dividends, and they would go unpaid. The Bank ought never to have had a *Restriction Act* without paying for it to the country. The Bank ought to reduce its rate of discount. The Sinking Fund ought to be spent in the Unfunded Debt, for, by purchasing in the 3 or 3½ per Cents. instead of the Unfunded Debt, the country would lose 200,000*l.* in the expenditure of the 3,000,000*l.* of Sinking Fund. On all the grounds he had stated, he wished to see the Right Hon. Gentleman employ the surplus revenue only in the way he had pointed out.

It is to be observed, that the ministers made no answer to these observations. Twice does Huskisson mention the calling-in of the one-pound notes; twice he says that he does not believe that it would produce any inconvenience; but, one can clearly see that he believes that the project will not be carried into effect; that a bank-restriction act will be the result; and it is manifest that he, who had a principal hand in passing the one-pound note bill, has here been beating about for the means of ascribing the restriction, which he expects, to something other than the measures in which he has had a hand. He talks about a plethora, about the bank having *too much money deposited with it*; he talks about the danger of restriction being produced by the great quantity of deposits lodged in the bank, and the great over-stock of money in the hands of the bankers.

Strange notion, that the bank should be run upon for money, because there is so much money dead in its own hands, and in the hands of the bankers! Strange notion, that the nation should be compelled to proclaim itself bankrupt, merely because it is too full of money. The truth is, that it is not money; it is so much of evidence of a right to demand money; and his fear is, that there is not money to answer the demand. Was there ever any thing so monstrous as the supposition that the bank is in danger of being run upon for money, merely because there is so much money, such a plethora of capital, that no man knows how to find employment for it. But you see running through the whole of his speech, the most confident expectation of a bank-restriction, at no distant day. He expresses his *wish* that the Bank of England "should not be under 'the necessity of either disturbing the circulation of the country, or of reverting to a restriction.'" It is very curious, that this is *the wish* which he expressed in the month of July, 1825, and almost in these very same words; and, in four months afterwards, the *panic* came. He concludes his speech by observing that the *previous signs of the convulsion of 1825 were now obvious*: so that, in spite of his Majesty's increase of financial resources, here is manifestly the opinion of the coach-and-four gentleman, that another storm, of some sort, is at hand. Mr. Maberly tells us, that "in the year 1825, the bank could scarcely have gone on two hours longer, without a restriction act;" that is to say, without an open declaration of national insolvency; without proclaiming to all the world that the government was a beggar; without making an emission of assignats as vile, and more vile, than those which distinguished the reign of Robespierre, without the total ruin of people by millions, and without, in short, blowing up the whole of this famous financial system, and, in all human probability, the state along with it. Mr. Maberly says, that we were within *two hours* of this; and, while this remains wholly uncontradicted by the ministers, those ministers advised the king to tell his people, that he views

the state of our financial resources with peculiar gratification ! Mr. Maberly further says (and he says it uncontradicted) that the bank might, if it chose, demand a restriction act, or refuse to lend the government the money to pay the dividends, and that then the dividends would "go unpaid." Now this remained wholly uncontradicted by those who have now told us in the King's Speech that our financial resources are greatly upon the increase ! It must be a solid system, indeed, that can enable the bank to demand to be protected against its creditors, or to cause the dividends to go unpaid. Upon the whole, here we have the apprehensions of these two men, and here we have the expectations of all rational people. The speech may say what it pleases : it will not alter the nature of the thing ; and, before this day twelvemonths, that thing will assume a shape that shall form a suitable commentary on this boasting speech. Already the cold hand of the one-pound note bill is felt in every part of the country. In spite of the bad appearances as to the harvest, the advance in the price of wheat has not exceeded five shillings a quarter, though both small crop and bad quality are certain ; and, so difficult have the millers found it to get a better price for the flour, that the advance in the flour has caused no addition in the price of the bread. Under similar circumstances in paper times, the price of flour would have advanced, by this time, ten or fifteen shillings a sack. In the meanwhile, foreign wheat comes in from abroad, though the duty is, now, *thirty shillings and eightpence on the quarter of wheat*. The English farmers will have low price, after all, compared with the small quantity that they will have to sell ; but still the people will have to pay this enormous tax upon their bread. And, is it not something a little indecent to complain of the American Tariff, which imposes a duty of eighty per cent. upon only three articles of English manufacture, while our corn-bill imposes a duty of more than a hundred per cent. upon American wheat and flour ? The wheat in America is nothing like thirty shillings and eightpence the quarter,

English money : that is the duty which we impose upon a quarter of American wheat ; and yet, because the Americans impose eighty per cent. duty upon three of our articles of manufacture, we have the stupidity to talk of *retaliation* ! Such are the solid financial resources that we possess ; and if there come new bales of paper and bank-restriction, the solidity will become apparent to all the world ; for, I repeat, that another bank-restriction is an open declaration of national insolvency. Huskisson regards it evidently in the same light. He almost says that he is afraid to allude to the subject ; but he is compelled to allude to it, and he observes that no sacrifice would be too great for the country to make, in order to prevent a renewal of all the calamities which *another* bank-restriction would bring upon the country. He knows that another bank-restriction act would be the total ruin of the system. He clearly expects this result ; and, if the newspapers speak truth, he is gone to philosophize *à la distance*, upon the consequences to which the expected restriction would lead.

Paragraph 16 assures us that his Majesty will employ his unabated exertions "to inculcate among foreign powers *a spirit of mutual good will*." Bless us ! how pacific and gentle we are become in these days ! We want the lion to lie down with the lamb. Having the greatest captain of the age at the head of us, and having a most thundering standing army in the midst of profound peace, we, quite in the quaker style, are wholly employed in producing peace and quietness among all the nations on the earth. Not content with having peace for ourselves, and letting the rest of the world do what it likes we must needs make all other nations, or, at least, pray them to do it, live in peace and in brotherly love. This is a new tone, and this is a new office for England. It is very amiable ; and it is amongst those good effects which poverty produces wherever it exists. The French sarcasms at our immobility must be passed over in silence : they smell us, however : all the world smells us ; and these disguises will answer no purpose : this is the price that we have

to pay for having contracted an irredeemable debt in order to carry on war with a view of preventing the contagion of reform reaching England. That struggle is not over yet: Huskisson's apprehensions show that it is not over. The one-pound notes were produced by the anti-jacobin war: they have yet to be suppressed; when they have been suppressed, and when sixty millions of golden taxes can be raised in the year, there may be some hope of a successful termination of the struggle against reform.

Paragraph 13 I have chosen to notice last; because it contains his Majesty's promise *to apply our money with the utmost economy*. This is, indeed, qualified by an observation that the economy must be compatible with the *dignity of the crown* and the *permanent interest* of the country. These are very extensive qualifications: the dignity of the crown may be thought to require that which common men would deem very little consistent with economy. They might deem the dignity of the crown not to require the pulling down of one new palace, the building up of another new palace, the pulling down of great part of that, as soon as it was built up; and they might deem the palace of Edward the Third good enough for any King without expending enormous sums of money in alterations made in it. Common men might look upon the costly things stuck up at Hyde Park Corner and upon all the tumblings and changings about in the parks at so enormous an expense, as contributing not at all to the dignity of the crown; and, in short, common men may think that the less expensive a crown is the more dignified it is in the eyes of a sensible people. Such men perceive no want of dignity in the office of the President of the United States. Whoever has been an observer of the character and conduct of WASHINGTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON, MADDISON, MONRO, and lastly of the SON OF ADAMS, have observed in them men of spotless life, of the strictest decorum in manners, of the most perfect dignity in language and deportment, and have seen them treated with respect the most profound,

by all the people under their control, and by every foreign nation on the face of the earth. They have seen these men of real dignity succeed each other, while a nation has grown up under them to have a population surpassing that of England, and to have a marine, whether commercial or warlike, the rival of that nation that called herself the mistress of the sea. During the fifty-two years that these men have succeeded each other in the chief rulership of that country, *the whole of them have, in the whole of the fifty-two years, received only the sum of two hundred and ninety-one thousand pounds*; that is to say, less than a quarter part of the sum which the King of England and his family have received, *in every one of those fifty-two years!* Money! it is not money that can communicate *dignity*: it is not splendour: it is not gold and silver and jewels: it is not horses in fine trappings, and carriages gilt with gold. JEFFERSON was so poor as to be in actual need of selling his paternal estate before his death, in order to have the means of supporting his wonted hospitality; and yet, who ever maintained his dignity and the dignity of his country in a more admirable manner than that celebrated man? Therefore, common men may think that the dignity of the crown would be better consulted by unexpensive habits in the prince, by greater simplicity of manners, by a less forbidding distance between him and his subjects, and particularly by his imitating every sovereign that we have ever heard of before upon the face of the earth, in *receiving with his own hands the petitions of his people*, and not suffering his attendant to fling such petitions out of his carriage, as the newspapers informed us some time ago, and as I was sorry to see, not contradicted, was done in St. James's Park. There is no real dignity that can possibly attend extravagant expenditure. People may submit, they do submit, and for a while, and for a long while, they must submit, to such expenditure; but they do not submit with a good will: they cannot refrain from comparing that expenditure with their own miserable means of out-going; and the wise course

is, not to excite in their bosoms feelings which such expenditure must inevitably produce. The people of America are all satisfied with their Presidents : they cost them nothing worth naming : the honour of the station is the greatest part of the reward ; and where dignity is sought for through the channel of any other means, it is of a description that few men of sober reflection will covet. For my part, I can see no use of money for the purpose of upholding the dignity of the crown : it is clothed with powers quite sufficient to uphold its dignity : though the King were not to exceed in his expenses even the sum received by a President of the United States, nobody would respect the king's authority less ; and I am quite sure that no one would feel less attachment to his person and family. High sums have been mentioned as necessary to ensure high character and unbroken authority : never upon earth was there character so high, so perfectly spotless, so dignified, so admired, as that which has been seen in the Presidents of the United States : in the whole of the fifty-two years of the glorious progress of that great republic, no man, amongst all the bitter wars of party and of faction, has ever ascribed any one vice, any one spot in character, to any one of the Presidents ; and as to their authority, it has been obeyed without a murmur, and with the greatest alacrity and zeal, by a people the most intelligent, the best informed as to their rights, the most jealous and tenacious of those rights, bearing at the same time within them, bravery to resist any encroachment, however small, on any part of those rights. Again, therefore, I say that here we have a living example of the inutility of money to communicate dignity to rulers ; and, therefore, I trust, or, rather, I should say, I wish, that the experiment may be tried, upon a small scale at any rate, in this country, now weighed down by debts and taxes, producing ruin and misery such as never were before witnessed in the world. But, the speech further speaks of those permanent interests of the country with which the economy must be compatible. It is very hard to say what is meant by

so general an expression as this. The French minister of marine, Monsieur HYDE DE NEUVILLE, gave, the other day, a comparative statement of the officers of the military marine, in the English service and in the French service. His statement was as follows :—

	English.	French.
General Officers	215	30
Captains of ships of the line	850	80
Captains of Frigates, and Officers of the same rank	868	120
Lieutenants and Ensigns..	3,710	728
Masters	543	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	6,186	958

The reader will observe that the French call their *admirals*, *generals*, and their midshipmen, I believe, they call *ensigns*. I take this statement as I find it in our newspapers, without being answerable for its correctness. I believe it, however, to be something about the truth. Doubtless, our half-pay are included here ; but then, this half-pay far surpasses the French full pay. The difference is enormous, to be sure ; and, my belief is, that we have, at any rate, more than one admiral to every ship of the line. As to our army and all put together, I think Mr. Hume stated the half-pay officers to be about *seventeen thousand in number*, making, with those on full pay, one commissioned officer, perhaps, to about every *five private men* ! The French, with their mere handful of officers have, I believe, more ships at sea and fit for sea than we have at this moment ; and, as to the Americans, the whole annual expense of their navy, including the new ships that they are building every year, does not amount to a quarter part so much as is expended on our half-pay officers of the navy. Here, then, is something ; here is an expenditure, which is, surely, not necessary to the *permanent interests of the country*. It never can be the interest of the country to load itself with these monstrous charges, no diminution of which can be obtained by any remonstrance from any quarter. On the contrary, we see naval and military academies, maintained at the public expense, for the express purpose of providing new batches of officers. Out of these seminaries, in which the

taxes raised, partly, at least, upon *the poor*, for the purpose of giving education to the children of *the rich*; out of these seminaries must come new broods of cadidates for posts upon this expensive list; and the great curiosity of the matter is, that while we are called upon to give such sums for the raising up of naval and military officers, our language is *as pacific as that of Quakers*: and every speech, whether from Minister or King, deprecates the thought of war, as something too horrible to remain for a moment in the human mind. If, then, we are to have no war; if we are to see the dominions of friends cut up; if we are to see the French in Cadiz and Corunna, and still to hold our tongues and not move a hand, why all these studiously long prepared military means, and, above all things, why these enormous military and naval expenses? We have now been thirteen years at peace. During that time, the half-pay and the military and naval academies have cost us the better part of four-score millions of money; so that, we have been expending, on the relics of the old anti-jacobin war, that which would have enabled us to bid the Russian fleet remain at Constadt, and to bid the Russian army remain on its own side of the Pruth. "Financial resources," indeed! What *resource* can we have, while all is swallowed up as fast as it can be got from the people? The late war has mortgaged the lands and the houses, and in the navy and army that it has entailed on us, it has mortgaged the remainder of the taxes. Commerce, trade, manufactures, every brick and stone, every spinning jenny, and every blast-furnace, the labour of the living and the labour of the unborn, all have been mortgaged by the late "glorious war," which, let it never be forgotten, was waged for the purpose of putting down the French revolutionist in order to prevent the contagion of REFORM from reaching England. This was the object of that struggle, which has hitherto been fatal to the people of England,

but which, I repeat, is by no means terminated yet. That it may terminate in the happiness of the people and the permanent greatness and the glory of the country, is, and always has been, the prayer of

WM. COBBETT.

WAR, OR PEACE.

In my next I shall address the DUKE of WELLINGTON, in the hope of being able to show him, that, with the present system, *it is impossible for us to go to war*, without causing a convulsion; that, yet, to remain at peace may be *equally dangerous*; and that, therefore, a *change of system ought immediately to take place*.

SQUASHES.

I shall next Saturday, send a *Cart-load* of a variety of these to *Covent Garden Market*. I have not raised them for profit; but, merely to prove how easily they may be raised. They were sowed in the *open field* on the 10th of May. The crop is and will be very great, though the weather has, of late, been very unfavourable, these plants delighting in dry and hot weather. If any gentleman has a mind to see a whole field of *Indian-Corn*, he may now see it, in full bloom, at Barn-Elm.

PATENT WIRE CARTRIDGES.

THE Proprietors having opened an extensive Manufactory, No. 14, Charlotte-street, Rathbone-place, beg to inform Gun-makers, Merchants, Captains of Ships, and others, that they may now be supplied on advantageous terms, with the above article, of any size, and adapted for various purposes, price 2*s.* per box, containing 12 dozen (the smallest quantity sold at the factory); in which are enclosed directions for their use, &c.—A short statement of some extraordinary Pigeon shooting, the opinions of some of the first shots in the Kingdom, with a few general Observations on the Cartridge, may also be had at the Factory, and of the principal Gun-makers in Town and Country.